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Sifting Through the Arbitrators
For The Woman, The Minority,
The Newcomer
1

Douglas Pilawa *
This Note examines the process of choosing an arbitrator
in international arbitration. Much of the debate and criticism of
this process addresses the lack of diversity in arbitral tribunals
around the world. Diversity in this context means not only
traditional diversity (i.e. gender, race, ethnicity), but also the
basic idea of adding “fresh faces” to arbitral tribunals.
Yet the ethical obligation to provide a client with the best
chance to prevail encourages counsel to choose a familiar, wellknown name with an established “track record” over a littleknown “dark horse.” This tension illustrates a fundamental
point of friction in international arbitration: choosing
experienced arbitrators or “fresh faces,” and which group
ensures continued success of international arbitration as a
dispute-resolution system. This Note argues that much of the
debate and the calls to action are unconvincing for two reasons.
First, the unsupported arguments used to justify proactive
efforts to diversify arbitral tribunals frustrate skeptics from
seeing the actual benefits that diversity could bring. Second, the
yearly surveys that state the same findings—that arbitral
tribunals are not diverse enough—are crucially misdirected.
Instead, the groups behind those surveys would be better served
to show how diversity of arbitral tribunals could solve other
problematic areas in international arbitration—like lengthy
proceedings and rising costs. Once clients and counsel alike
begin to take notice of diversity’s collateral effect, the
subsequent natural shift to a more diverse arbitrator pool will
occur and prove sustainable for the health of the whole system.

1.
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THE LINE, THE WAY: NEW POEMS (John Martin ed., 2004).
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Introduction
Throughout the rise of international arbitration’s place in the
legal world, insiders and outsiders have observed that the same names
continue to dominate arbitral tribunals across the globe. 2 These highprofile arbitrators sit in judgment of arbitrations with staggering
2.

Lisa Bench Nieuwveld, Choosing the Weathered Veteran or the Young
Buck,
WOLTERS
KLUWER
(Jan.
8,
2011),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration
.com/2011/01/08/choosingthe-weathered-veteran-or-the-young-buck/
[https://perma.cc/F4G5YFZC].
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amounts of money at stake. 3 In investor-state arbitration, the
ramifications of an arbitral proceeding can go beyond money;
sometimes an entire country’s political system is implicated. 4 In a
system that promotes party autonomy and unfettered freedom, how is
it, then, that the same people dominate these tribunals? Arbitrators
are not elected like a U.S. Federal Judges—they do not serve lifetime
tenures. 5 This phenomenon has exacerbated the claim that
international arbitration is an insular club of a few privileged elite. 6
Some have even referred to this group of international arbitrators as a
mafia—a corrupt inner circle of lawyers and arbitrators who trade
appointments for financial gain and professional prestige. 7
Admittedly, seeing the same private individuals ruling on million
and billion dollar claims behind closed doors objectively raises an
eyebrow. Who are these arbitrators and why do they always decide
these cases? This innocuous inquiry reveals an intense debate over the
lack of diversity in international arbitral tribunals. 8 While some
approach the subject with reservation, others claim that the
continued existence of international arbitration depends upon
increased diversity. 9 In general, efforts to regulate the arbitration
selection process 10 receive praise and criticism. 11 Parties who welcome
3.

See Stephen P. Anway, Advocacy in International Arbitration, in THE
GUIDE TO ADVOCACY 117 (Stephen Jagusch QC et al. eds., 2016)
(discussing the high stakes involved in international arbitration).

4.

See Hans Smit, The Pernicious Institution of the Party-Appointed
Arbitrator, in COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES: PERSPECTIVES ON TOPICAL
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ISSUES BY THE VALE COLUMBIA CENTER ON
SUSTAINABLE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT No. 33 (Karl P. Sauvant et
al. eds., 2010) (discussing how decisions in investor-state arbitrations
can affect the state and its people).

5.

Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, with Catherine A. Rogers, The
Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 Aᴍ. U. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. Rᴇᴠ. 957,
959 (2005).

6.

Charles Nairac, Due Process Considerations in the Constitution of
Arbitral Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE RULE OF
LAW: CONTRIBUTION AND CONFORMITY 119, 140. (Andrea Menaker ed.,
2017).

7.

Sam Luttrell, Chapter 1: Bias in International Commercial Arbitration,
in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE NEED FOR A “REAL DANGER”
TEST 1, 5 (Kluwer Law International ed., 2009).

8.

See generally Ricardo Dalmaso Marques “To Diversify or Not to
Diversify”? Report on the Session Who Are the Arbitrators?, in
LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES, 579 (Albert Jan van den
Berg ed., 2015) (providing a short, but thorough look into the diversity
questions typically addressed in any critique of the subject matter).

9.

Id.

10.

For example, the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in
International Arbitration were introduced in 2004 to address disclosure
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this change perceive the efforts as an attempt to rectify certain
wrongs in the system. 12 Others, however, view these sorts of efforts as
infringing upon the sacrosanct freedom that international arbitration
promises 13—the same freedom that has largely contributed to its
success as the premier dispute resolution mechanism for cross-country
disputes. 14

obligations for arbitrators. In its own words, “[t]he 2004 Guidelines
reflected the view that the standards [of disclosure] existing at the time
lacked sufficient clarity and uniformity in their application. “The
Guidelines, therefore, set forth some ‘General Standards and
Explanatory Notes on the Standards’. Moreover, in order to promote
greater consistency and to avoid unnecessary challenges and arbitrator
withdrawals and removals, the Guidelines list specific situations
indicating whether [certain conflicts of interest] warrant disclosure or
disqualification of an arbitrator.” Int’l Bar Assoc. [IBA], Guidelines on
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, at 2 (October 23,
2014)
https://www.
ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.
aspx [https://perma.cc/2EB9-6E7N].
11.

See Margaret Moses, The Role of the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of
Interest in Arbitrator Challenges, WOLTERS KLUWER (Nov. 23, 2017),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/11/23/role-ibaguidelines-conflicts-interest-arbitrator-challenges/
[https://perma.cc/JL3T-V5PC] (noting that “the Guidelines, even
though non-binding, have become quite influential in the face of
increasing challenges to international arbitrators and awards on the
basis of arbitrator conflicts. The Guidelines are frequently viewed by
courts and arbitral institutions as providing relevant criteria for
assessing the impartiality and independence of a challenged
arbitrator.”); but see Will Sheng Wilson Koh, Think Quality Not
Quantity 34 J.INT’L ARB. 711 (2017) (taking issue with the quantitative
approach that the IBA Guidelines uses with respect to certain aspects of
the arbitrator selection process, most notably, repeat appointments).

12.

See generally Samaa A.F. Haridi, Towards Greater Gender and Ethnic
Diversity in International Arbitration, 2 BCDR INT’L ARB. REV. 305,
314 (2015) (detailing studies of implicit biases and positing that such
implicit biases against women and minorities exist in international
arbitration).

13.

Koh, supra note 11, at 738 (“Depending upon one’s opinion of the
system of unilateral party-appointed arbitrators, the quantitative
approach [to challenging arbitrator on the basis of repeat appointments]
can be seen either as an intrusion on the parties’ fundamental right to
select arbitrators or a small step towards safeguarding the legitimacy of
arbitration.”).

14.

See generally Mia Louise Livingstone, Party Autonomy in International
Commercial Arbitration: Popular Fallacy or Proven Fact? 25 J. INT’L
ARB. 529 (2008) (addressing party-autonomy in international arbitration
and actually investigating whether this facet of international arbitration
is still true).
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However desirable and morally good those efforts to diversify
tribunals may be, they arguably collide with an attorney’s ethical
obligation to provide their client the best chance to prevail. No one
seems to disagree with the premise that, given the choice between an
arbitrator with a favorable jurisprudence to one’s side and a totally
unknown newcomer, a competent lawyer will choose the former. But
every year, more and more voices call for change. 15 As explored in the
next section of this Note, the literature on this subject comes in many
forms and at a quick pace: presentations are given on the topic,
articles are written, and “grassroots” efforts are made to diversify the
practice on a near-monthly basis.
By examining why individuals believe diverse tribunals positively
affect international arbitration, we can determine whether the
continuance of this dispute resolution mechanism is in jeopardy. In
asking that question, we can also hypothesize whether the call for
diversity must be answered, and more importantly, how it should be
answered. The analysis leads to one of the great tensions in the
diversity debate. On one side is party autonomy and client interests—
international arbitration was founded on the principle that the parties
control the process. On the other side is the value that diversity can
bring to international arbitration and the struggle to convince
practitioners that party autonomy does not have to be subverted in
the quest for diverse tribunals. Thus, how to answer the diversity
question is the most important aspect of toeing this line between
party autonomy and the benefits of diversity.
Part I of this Note explores the current research trends and
critiques of arbitral tribunals, and looks at the most recent survey on
diversity in international arbitration. Parts II and III examine the
importance of the party-appointed arbitrator as evidenced by the
history of arbitration and the importance of the arbitrator selection
process in today’s arbitral proceedings. Part IV focuses on some of the
primary reasons for which international arbitral tribunals have
become homogenous. Part V asks to what extent does a lack of
diversity harm international arbitration, and analyzes three possible
ways homogeneity affects the quality of the arbitral system. Part VI
addresses the largest obstacle remaining in the diversity debate:
changing behavior. Part VII concludes by illustrating how organic
solutions—like taking into consideration financial incentives—could
lead to more diverse tribunals in international arbitration.

15.

See generally Jonathan Mackojc, 10 Hot Topics for International
Arbitration
in
2017
(Feb.
18,
2017),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/
02/18/booked/
[https://perma.cc/ARW2-WRC6] (highlighting the arbitrator selection
process as a “hot topic” for 2017).
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I.

Arbitral Tribunals are a Perennially Rich Topic
of Debate and Critique.

Arbitrators, the selection process of arbitrators, and diversity of
arbitral tribunals are perennially rich topics in the international
arbitration community. In February 2017, the Kluwer Arbitration
Blog published its “10 Hot Topics for International Arbitration in
2017.” 16 Arbitrator Selection Process was number two on the list;17
Diversity in International Arbitration was number nine. 18 Indeed,
2017 saw a flurry of law publications on the subject, including surveys
detailing the gender disparities in international arbitration. 19 In
March, Won Kidane published his analysis of cultural diversity in
international arbitration in his article Does Cultural Diversity
Improve or Hinder The Quality of Arbitral Justice? 20 In the same
month, Pennsylvania State University, in tandem with the
International Arbitration Association, hosted the “Contemporary
Issues & Emerging Trends in International Arbitration” conference.21
One of the main panel discussions involved women in arbitration and
the diversity issues related to gender in international arbitration. 22
Later, in Fall 2017, The International Dispute Resolution News, a
publication of the American Bar Association, published an article
titled Diversity in International Arbitration: Daring To Open New
Doors. 23 Even up until the very last days of the year, scholars were
writing about diversity. Catherine Rogers, a notable international
16.

Id.

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

See Dr. Markus Altenkirch & Dr. Jan Frohloff, Gender Diversity in
International
Arbitration
–
Statistics
(July
3,
2017),
https://globalarbitrationnews
.com/gender-diversity-in-internationalarbitration-some-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/EK4M-EDY9].

20.

Won Kidane, Does Cultural Diversity Improve or Hinder The Quality of
Arbitral
Justice?
(Mar.
31,
2017),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com /2017/03/31/does-culturaldiversity-improve-or-hinder-the-quality-of-arbitral-justice/
[https://perma.cc/NMG2-ZSJF].

21.

João Marçal Martins, Penn Law to Host Forum on Key International
Arbitration Trends Including Post-Brexit and Trump Era Arbitration,
Enforcement and Annulment after Yukos and Diversity Issues (Mar. 15,
2017), https://globalarbitrationnews.com/20170315_event_penn_law/
[https://perma.cc/6PPW-6V2M].

22.

Id.

23.

Shari Manasseh Ohri, Esq., Diversity in International Arbitration:
Daring to Open New Doors, THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
NEWS 7 (Fall 2017).
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arbitration scholar, ended 2017 with her article The Key to Unlocking
the Arbitrator Diversity Paradox?: Arbitrator Intelligence, published
on December 27th. 24
The topic even made it into the 25th Annual Willem C. Vis
International
Commercial
Arbitration
Moot
problem—an
international arbitration competition with thousands of law school
participants. 25 One part of the mock legal problem dealt with the
challenging of an arbitrator (Mr. Prasad) over his repeat
appointments (a topic associated with lack of diversity) by the same
law firm as well as his ties to a third-party funder in the proceeding.26
In March 2018, for the oral arguments portion of the competition,
thousands of law students from around the world met in Vienna and
Hong Kong and argued about these very real, pressing issues, albeit in
a completely fictitious environment. 27
But even before 2017, the topic of arbitrator selection—and the
lack of diversity in international arbitration—was on the radar of
many scholars and practitioners. In 2015, a group of women
practitioners in international arbitration launched the website “Equal
Representation in Arbitration” (“ERA”). 28 The website’s focus is
“the Pledge:” an agreement to work towards nominating more women
as arbitrators. 29 In its own words, ERA represents that, “The Pledge
seeks to increase, on an equal opportunity basis, the number of
women appointed as arbitrators in order to achieve a fair
representation as soon as practically possible, with the ultimate goal
of full parity.” 30 Currently, 3,414 people have signed the Pledge.31
24.

Catherine Rogers, The Key to Unlocking the Arbitrator Diversity
Paradox?: Arbitrator Intelligence, WOLTERS KLUWER (Dec. 27, 2017),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/12/27/onarbitrators/ [https://perma.cc/V9HF-PZZN].

25.

The official 25th Vis Moot Problem is available for download at
https://vismoot.pace.edu/media/site/previous-moots/25th-vismoot/25thVisMootFinalPO2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXX4-EXLA]. On
the document itself, an arbitrator in the fictitious problem is officially
challenged on page 38 (Notice of Challenge of Mr. Prasad).

26.

See id.

27.

25th Annual Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot
https://vismoot.pace.edu/media/site/previous-moots/25th-vismoot/programme.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYA4-EAZQ.

28.

REPRESENTATION
IN
ARBITRATION,
EQUAL
http://www.arbitrationpledge.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZMJ9-7AUE].

29.

Id.

30.

Commentary on the Pledge, EQUAL REPRESENTATION
http://www.arbitrationpledge.com/about-the-pledge
[https://perma.cc/Q2BB-CJJT].

31.

See EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN ARBITRATION, supra note 28. (As of
January 2019, the Pledge had 3,414 signatories. According to the
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Apart from the Pledge itself, the website currently serves as a
resource for numerous gender-diversity initiatives. 32
Similarly, in 2012, Catherine Rogers published her industrychanging proposal: Arbitrator Intelligence, Inc.—an initiative to
change the way that lawyers seek information about prospective
arbitrators. 33 Again, in its own terms, “Arbitrator Intelligence aims to
promote transparency, accountability, and diversity in arbitrator
appointments.” 34
No doubt, lack of diversity in international arbitration is a hot
topic. The Kluwer International Arbitration Blog 35 could have put it
on a “hot topic” list for every year for the past decade. While the
subject matter undeniably dominates the headlines in international
arbitration, breaking down those articles to concrete numbers shows
that practitioners themselves recognize the importance of diverse
tribunals—or at a minimum, believe that arbitral tribunals are not
diverse.
Pledge’s website, “This number includes both individual signatories
signing in their own name and organisation signatories to the ERA
Pledge. While most signatories are listed on this website, some
individual signatories choose to remain anonymous.”).
32.

Events, EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN ARBITRATION, http://www.
arbitrationpledge.com/events [https://perma.cc/6UKJ-UZMD.

33.

See Catherine Rogers, The International Arbitrator Information Project:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come, WOLTERS KLUWER (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2012/08/09/theinternational-arbitrator-information-project-an-idea-whose-time-hascome/ [https://perma.cc/8XKG-58FS]. (This blog post served as the
catalyst to Catherine Rogers’ project—well before she even had a name
for what would become Arbitrator Intelligence. In her call to action, she
describes the project as follows: “Perhaps the time has come for an
International Arbitrator Information Project, a resource to provide
reliable one-stop-shopping for information about arbitrators. The Project
would collect and provide instant electronic access to all available and
relevant awards, publications, judicial opinions, and commentaries about
individual arbitrators. It would also include a mechanism for providing
feedback about arbitrators. The challenge will be to solicit reliable and
useful feedback, and avoid feedback that resembles the gripes that
disgruntled customers cram into grocery store comment boxes.
Constructive and reliable information about arbitrators will be sought
primarily through questions addressing the specific issues that are
currently pursued through ad hoc inquiries. Judicious editorial policies
and procedures will provide safeguards against unprofessional postings
and disclosure of confidential information.”).

34.

The full mission statement of Arbitration Intelligence is available at
INTELLIGENCE,
http://www.arbitratorintelligence.org/
ARBITRATOR
[https://perma.cc/62VS-5C92].

35.

Kluwer Arbitration Blog, WOLTERS KLUWER, http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/ [https://perma.cc/TMQ5-PXPX.
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Surveys of practitioners make up a considerable chunk of the
empirical evidence that speaks to diversity in international
arbitration. Nearly every year, a new survey comes out that
corroborates the overwhelmingly used catch phrase to describe
international arbitral tribunals: male, pale, and stale. 36 But this
description is not as crass as one might think. The truth is that men
from North America or Western Europe do dominate most arbitral
tribunals, and most are generally older. 37 Practitioners agree.
In 2017, the law firm Berwin Leighton Paisner
(“BLP”)
conducted a survey (“BLP Survey”) on diversity in international
arbitration and polled 122 respondents from all over the globe. 38 84%
of the respondents thought there were too many men in arbitral
tribunals. 39 Furthermore, 80% of respondents thought that tribunals
contained too many white arbitrators. 40 The survey, though, was not
comprised solely of thoughts or observations—it showed raw data.
BLP pointed out that from January to November of 2016 at the
ICC, 41 only 20% of arbitrators appointed were women. 42 And, even
though raw numbers on minority appointments are difficult to obtain,
one statistician found that 45% of arbitral tribunals in ICSID
proceedings 43 from 1972 to May 2015 were composed of all AngloEuropean Arbitrators. 44
36.

Joseph Mamounas, ICCA 2014. Does “Male, Pale, and Stale” Threaten
the Legitimacy of International Arbitration? Perhaps, but There’s No
Clear Path to Change, WOLTERS KLUWER (Apr. 10, 2014),
http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2014/04/10/icca-2014does-male-pale-and-stale-threaten-the-legitimacy-of-internationalarbitration-perhaps-but-theres-no-clear-path-to-change/
[https://perma.cc/82HU-P924].

37.

Id.

38.

BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER, DIVERSITY
WE GETTING THERE? 7 (2017).

39.

Id. at 10.

40.

Id.

41.

INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., https://iccwbo.org/ [https://perma.cc/HF7JN6GY]. The ICC is the International Chamber of Commerce and has its
headquarters in Paris, France. The ICC is arguably the most recognized
arbitral institution in the world.

ON

ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS: ARE

42.

BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER, supra note 38, at 4.

43.

INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.
org/en/pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/S672-W5KV]. ICSID, or
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, was
established 1966 by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. It is “a
multilateral treaty formulated by the Executive Directors of
the World Bank to further the Bank’s objective of promoting
international investment. ICSID is an independent, depoliticized and
effective dispute-settlement institution. Its availability to investors and
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One might begin to wonder why the arbitrator receives such
attention. Yes, the arbitrator is ultimately the adjudicator of a
dispute—and the fact that a party can choose its arbitrator is distinct
from other forms of dispute resolution. 45 But those two reasons alone
cannot justify the sheer number of people writing on the subject, or
the resources used to conduct surveys every single year that
ultimately come to the same conclusion. Better explanations for the
importance of arbitrator dialogue exist in the history of the arbitrator
as well as the modern day selection process of one’s arbitrator.

II. The Party-Appointed Arbitrator is the
Cornerstone of International Arbitration from Time
Immemorial
The ability to appoint one’s arbitrator exemplifies and defines
international arbitration. 46 The party-appointed arbitrator’s roots
quite literally reach back to antiquity. 47 This should come as no
surprise: international arbitration itself dates back millennia, with
some scholars citing to cases that allegedly occurred in the 2000s
B.C. 48 Specifically regarding the role of the arbitrator, orators in both
the Classical and Hellenistic periods of Ancient Greece reference the
position of party-appointed arbitrator in speeches. 49 Party-appointed
arbitrators served important roles during the Renaissance, the
American Civil War, and during the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907. 50 In 1907, attendees at the Hague Conference described the
States helps to promote international investment by providing
confidence in the dispute resolution process. It is also available for statestate disputes under investment treaties and free trade agreements, and
as an administrative registry.” About ICSID, INT’L CTR. FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages
/about/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/BLQ6-KQTC].
44.

BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER, supra note 38, at 4.

45.

Gary Born, Chapter 12: Selection, Challenge and Replacement of
Arbitrators
in
International
Arbitration,
in,
INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1636, 1639 (Kluwer Law International 2d ed.
2014).

46.

Id.

47.

Sundaresh Menon, Adjudicator, Advocate, or Something in Between?
Coming to Terms with the Role of the Party-Appointed Arbitrator, 34 J.
INT’L. ARB. 348, 351-4 (2017).

48.

See Gary Born, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 6, 8 (2014)
(citing Lafont, L’arbitrage en Mésopotamie, 2000 Rev. arb. 557, 568-78,
noting, for example, the case of Ur v. Lagash in which the King of Uruk
ordered a city to return territory seized by force from another).

49.

Id.

50.

Id.
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opportunity for a party to select its own adjudicator as “a right which
is the very essence of arbitral justice.” 51 The Treaty of Washington—
implemented to settle disputes between Great Britain and the United
States—formed the basic structure of what is now international
arbitration, and it, too, depended upon the party-appointed
arbitrator. 52
Given the arbitrator’s role in history, some have even stated that
the party-appointed arbitrator is the cornerstone to the very existence
of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. 53 Indeed, party
appointments “were used as a tool to overcome the distrust between
disputants from diverse cultures. Without the comfort of being able to
appoint an arbitrator of one’s choosing, it was said that the parties
could not be brought to the table.” 54 History, therefore, accounts for
one of the reasons why arbitrator selection dominates criticism and
intrigue.
Today, the party-appointed arbitrator maintains this important
position, and selection of the arbitrator is considered to be the single
most important step in the arbitration process. 55 Not only is it of
fundamental importance that parties and counsel know how to select
the best arbitrator, but also, “a proper selection process is essential
for the protection and safeguard of the rights of the parties to the
arbitration.” 56 Identifying the criteria that counsel and parties seek in
potential arbitrators as well as understanding why these criteria
matter reinforces the seriousness of the decision, and provides a
background to why a lack of diversity in international arbitration
might be problematic.

III. The Resources, Time, and Effort Expended in The
Arbitrator-Selection Process Underscores the
Importance of the Arbitrator’s Role in International
Arbitration
Arbitrator selection has already been compared to the HasbroTM
family game “Guess Who.” 57 The game involves a board that has the
51.

Nairac, supra note 6, at 127.

52.

Menon, supra note 47, at 353.

53.

Id. at 354.

54.

Id.

55.

Douglas Earl Mclaren, Party-Appointed vs List-Appointed Arbitrators:
A Comparison, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 233, 233 (2003).

56.

Carlos Alberto Matheus López, Practical Criteria for
International Arbitrators, 31 J. INT’L ARB. 795, 796 (2014).

57.

Paul Baker, Why Picking an Arbitrator is Like Playing Guess WhoTM?
KLUWER
(Sept.
1,
2017),
WOLTERS
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faces of 24 individuals on it. 58 A player chooses a character with
distinguishing physical features (i.e. glasses, a certain hair color, facial
hair). 59 Then, the other players try to guess which character was
selected by asking questions like “Does this person have hair?” Or,
“Does this person wear glasses?” 60 With each answer, a character is
eliminated, and the pool of remaining individuals dwindles. 61
In its most basic form, this process is like arbitrator selection.
Lawyers from both parties begin to “construct” their arbitrator by
looking for individuals with certain characteristics—objective and
subjective factors—that all converge to one point, and at that point is
the arbitrator who meets all of the qualities sought by a party. For
example, an international arbitration proceeding might involve a
French contractual dispute. Thus, a lawyer with a list of names of
prospective arbitrators would ask of each candidate, “Does this
individual speak French?” Each case has its own intricacies, and the
character traits sought—as evidenced below—vary from case-to-case.
Like “Guess Who,” each trait sought eliminates a potential arbitrator
up until only one man or woman remains. But given the importance
of the party-appointed arbitrator, and the dueling sides in an
adjudicative process, arbitrator Guess Who becomes more a chess
match, with each side trying to gain a leg up by choosing the perfect
arbitrator. 62
The basic outline of the arbitrator selection process is as follows:
(1) review the candidate’s professional background; (2) conduct a
“word of mouth” interview of colleagues and practitioners to ascertain
personal details about the arbitrator; (3) review previous awards that
the arbitrator has issued, if possible; (4) analyze any and all articles,
treaties, or other publications that could possibly shed light on an
arbitrator’s disposition regarding a certain issue, especially if that
issue is in one’s proceeding; (5) identify any conflicts of interest that
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com
/2017/09/01/pickingarbitrator-like-playing-guess/[https://perma.cc/K7Z8-ZFTL].
58.

Guess Who Game Rules: How Do You Play Guess Who?, HOW DO YOU
PLAY IT, http://howdoyouplayit.com/guess-game-rules-play-guess-who/
[https://perma.cc/8BQG-BR3S].

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.

What makes a perfect arbitrator depends on the proceeding. But one of
the most highly sought qualities is an arbitrator with a favorable
jurisprudence to one’s side. A perfect arbitrator, in this case, would be
the arbitrator who will most likely rule in one’s favor. This
characteristic is a major part of the selection process. See López, supra
note 56, at 796 (“There is a tendency amongst the parties to seek the
greatest predictability in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal”).
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could possibly lead to disqualification of the arbitrator; (6) conduct a
pre-appointment interview—this is a hot-button issue in the
international arbitration community in of itself; 63 (7) finally, officially
appoint the arbitrator. 64 These steps further break down into two
subcategories: objective qualities and subjective qualities. 65 Striking
the perfect balance between these two categories is the goal of the
arbitrator selection process.
A.

The Typical Objective Qualities sought in the Arbitrator-Selection
Process

In general, the objective qualities of the arbitrator selection
process are a combination of the minimal procedural structure of the
arbitration—like the number of arbitrators—coupled with the pieces
of information that professionals routinely share on their CVs or their
websites: expertise, language abilities, compensation, etc. 66 For
example, the number of arbitrators and language of the arbitration
proceeding are two fundamental objective qualities. 67 Both of these
factors usually stem from the dispute-resolution clause, or the
procedural rules chosen by the parties. 68 Linguistic skills matter, of
course, for the proceeding itself. 69 But imagine the scenario of a
dispute that involves a contract written in a particular language—a
language that might even be different than the language of the
proceeding itself. Undoubtedly, a party will look for an arbitrator who
can read and understand the contract that sits at the heart of the
dispute.
Expertise of the arbitrator matters, too. 70 Does the dispute
involve technical matters that require an arbitrator with a specific
skill set? An industry expert, who is also an arbitrator, “fosters
efficiency, since less time needs to be spent educating [the arbitral
tribunal] about technical matters. Arbitrators with such expertise can

63.

See Kabir Singh and Elan Krishna, Interviewing Prospective
KLUWER
(Sept.
29,
2015),
Arbitrators,
WOLTERS
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration. com/2015/09/29/interviewingprospective-arbitrators/ [https://perma.cc/KRT5-5V8H] (detailing the
right and wrong way to conduct a pre-appointment interview).

64.

López, supra note 56, at 802.

65.

Id. at 796-801.

66.

See id. at 796-800 (enumerating the various objective factors used when
considering an arbitrator).

67.

Id. at 796-7.

68.

Id.

69.

Id. at 797.

70.

Id. at 798.
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‘cut through’ the issues.” 71 This desire for a technical expert must be
balanced with the need to have arbitrators that, above all else,
understand the technicalities of the arbitration proceeding itself. Since
the integrity of the arbitration proceeding has a potential effect on
the validity of the award in the face of judicial scrutiny, counsel
might be inclined to sacrifice this technical expertise for the safer bet
of an arbitrator who simply follows the rules. 72
The availability of an arbitrator and the standing and influence of
an arbitrator are two important, interrelated factors. 73 Elite and
prestigious arbitrators are a natural choice for counsel for numerous
reasons. The elite arbitrator can exercise influence inside the arbitral
tribunal. 74 Furthermore, the decorated arbitrator is less likely to be
accused of favoritism in the party-appointed system because his or her
rise to the top of the profession stems from being “just and
competent” and not partisan or influenced by the party who
appointed the arbitrator. 75 But the difficulty with choosing a topname arbitrator is twofold. First, top arbitrators typically have higher
fees for their services. 76 Second, these industry giants are typically
booked—they are in arbitral proceedings all over the world, and their
schedules and availability become problematic. 77 Some arbitrators are
full-time arbitrators, while others are practicing attorneys, law
professors, or government officials. 78 Accordingly, trying to sync the
schedule of the proceeding with the fixed schedule of a professor, or
with the schedule of an in-demand arbitrator can delay proceedings
considerably. Imagine the scheduling nightmare if a panel of three
high-demand arbitrators is constituted. Thus, speed of the
proceedings becomes a tactical consideration when choosing an
arbitrator. 79
71.

Charles J. Moxley, Jr., Selecting the Ideal Arbitrator, 60 DISPUTE
RESOLUTION J. 24, 27 (2005).

72.

López, supra note 56, at 798 (explaining that “whether a technician or a
lawyer is chosen, they must have knowledge of arbitration law, because
they might incur various errors in procedendo that could result in the
annulment of the arbitral award. In this sense, the arbitrators will need
to have experience conducting arbitration proceedings effectively and
expeditiously”).

73.

Id. at 798-9.

74.

Id. at 799.

75.

Id. at 798.

76.

Id. at 799.

77.

Id. at 798.

78.

Id.

79.

Yu Jin Tay, Reflections on the Selection of Arbitrators in International
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE COMING OF A NEW
AGE? 112, 128 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2013).
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These characteristics obviously do not make up all of the
objective qualities in the selection process. But they form the very
basic form of the arbitral tribunal and lay the foundation for who will
serve as the arbitrators. Once this base level is established, then the
focus turns to the subjective qualities and finding the right arbitrator
match for one’s case.
B.

The Subjective Qualities of the Arbitrator-Selection Process and
How these Characteristics Affect the Proceeding

Subjective qualities often involve what are known as the “soft
skills” of an arbitrator 80 and address an arbitrator’s individual work
habits, styles, and propensities. In layman’s terms, it is a personality
test. Choosing the right personality is pivotal to one’s case. It is
important to remember that the arbitrator may end up on an arbitral
tribunal with two other members. Strong personalities—and egos—
matter. 81 This potential of competing personalities on the arbitral
tribunal lead counsel to ask an often-overlooked question: does the
arbitrator “play well” with others? 82 Those with the temperament of a
“diplomat” tend to be more attractive choices. 83
Subjective qualities manifest themselves with respect to the way
in which an arbitrator even approaches a case. For example, a major
subjective quality is the dichotomy of big-picture people versus
sticklers—”the conceptual, open-minded, equity-oriented person at
one extreme, and the rule-oriented, no-nonsense, by-the-numbers
strict constructionist at the other.” 84 An offshoot of these
characteristics is the importance of an arbitrator with strong
management skills. 85 Arbitration’s freedom from the procedural
constraints of litigation is one of its greatest assets. 86 But if this
freedom is not managed properly, it can lead to delays and increased
costs in the arbitral process. 87 Indeed, parties might actively seek an
80.

Ema Vidak-Gojkovic et al., Chapter II: The Arbitrator and the
Arbitration Procedure, Puppies or Kittens? How to Better Match
Arbitrators to Party Expectations, in AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 61, 64 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds.,
2016).

81.

Tay, supra note 79, at 126.

82.

Vidak-Gojkovic, supra note 80, at 66.

83.

Tay, supra note 79, at 126.

84.

Moxley, supra note 71, at 26.

85.

Jessika Stadwick, Four Factors to Consider When Selecting an
Arbitrator ALTAMIMI & CO. (June 2013), http://www.tamimi.com/lawupdate-articles/four-factors-to-consider-when-selecting-an-arbitrator/
[https://perma.cc/9YF8-G7MD].

86.

Id.

87.

Id.
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arbitrator known for “creative case management” because the case
demands that type of proceeding. 88
These subjective qualities are important insofar as one has
concerns regarding the procedural management of the case—and most
practitioners do have this concern. 89 As important as these
procedural-personality proxies are, far more important are the
potential landmines that hide from counsel in the field of arbitrators.
Is the arbitrator that lawyer who was a bully when serving in the
judiciary and now makes counsel “jump through unnecessary hoops of
their creation?” 90 Some call this personality type “the superjudge.”91
Or, is the prospective arbitrator the type of person who cannot
maintain order and lets the arbitral process get out of hand? 92 This
type is called “the wimp.” 93 The personality types and potential
ramifications on the arbitral process are endless. 94
These few questions addressed make up, understandably, just a
fraction of the game that counsel plays when picking the right
arbitrator. While some of the information sought is readily
available—like basic CV information—accurate information speaking
to the subjective qualities “can be the single most difficult challenge
when identifying candidates for nomination.” 95 The subjective
qualities are everything that the objective qualities are not—they are
the unknown bits of information that shed light on an arbitrator’s
personal personality and legal personality.
The logical implication of each objective and subjective factor is a
narrowing of the prospective candidates. Each box checked that meets
a necessary or desirable quality in a prospective arbitrator eliminates
a name from the candidate list. And, if one considers how many boxes
need to be checked, these “required and desirable qualities result in

88.

Tay, supra note 79, at 128.

89.

See Vidak-Gojkovic, supra note 80, at 65 (elaborating on a 2010 survey
in which respondents emphasized these soft skills as important and
having an impact on the efficiency and cost of a case).

90.

López, supra note 56, at 801.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

See id. (listing other personality types like the egomanic, the
superlawyer, the White Knight, and the unemployed opportunist and
giving a breakdown of how they affect the arbitral tribunal).

95.

Vidak-Gojkovic, supra note 80, at 64.
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the selection of a small group of highly talented international
arbitrators.” 96
A dilemma exists—or at least a contradiction on this point. Since
the ideal arbitrator always depends on the particular case, 97 and each
case theoretically has its own ins and outs—its own boxes that need
to be checked—diverse tribunals should be the norm rather than the
exception. To have the same people adjudicating the same claims
would imply that cases are so similar, every time, that counsel chose
the same arbitrators because their specific qualities mandate that
arbitrator choice. We know this to be false, though. The easiest way
to show it is false is the fact that the same arbitrators have sat on
investment treaty tribunals as well as commercial arbitration
tribunals. 98
People refer to this group of select individuals as the “pool” of
arbitrators. 99 The constant critique is that the pool of arbitrators is
too small, and increasing the pool of arbitrators is a necessary first
step to diversifying arbitral tribunals. 100 But the diversity issue is not
that simple. Throwing names into this pool will not solve the problem
without also considering the other major systemic factors in
international arbitration that stifle tribunal diversity.

96.

Chiara Giorgetti, The Arbitral Tribunal: Selection and Replacement of
Arbitrators, in LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 143, 156 (2014).

97.

Moxley, supra note 71, at 25.

98.

International arbitration is primarily broken down into two distinct
categories: international commercial arbitration and investment-treaty
arbitration. The former is usually a contract dispute between two
international companies who have agreed to submit their disputes to
arbitration. The latter refers to arbitration proceedings between a
claimant investor of one state and a respondent government of another
state, in whose jurisdiction the investor claims to have made an
investment that is the subject of a dispute. This system allows for
individuals to bring arbitration proceedings against countries in their
sovereign capacities. While both of these forms of arbitration share
similarities, their differences are tremendous. For an in-depth look at
investor-state arbitration and its history, see Andrew Newcombe Lluís
Paradell, Chapter 1 - Historical Development of Investment Treaty Law,
in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF
TREATMENT 1 (Andrew Newcombe & Lluís Paradell eds., Jan. 2009).

99.

Jacomijn J. van Haerolte-Van Hof, Diversity in Diversity, in 18
LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES 638, 638-39 (Albert Jan
van den Berg ed., 2015).

100. Id.

411

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Sifting Through the Arbitrators

IV. The Other Contributing Factors to Non-Diverse
Tribunals That Further Complicate Diversity
Efforts.
Several reasons exist for the overall lack of diversity in
international arbitration beyond the small pool of arbitrator thinking.
Many acknowledge the notion of the “old boys club,” 101 and
furthermore, “the tendency of outside counsel to appoint arbitrators
who are similar to them” 102 as leading reasons for a lack of diversity.
Implicit bias, some argue, has led to the cycle of women and ethnic
candidates’ exclusion from arbitral tribunals. 103
The old boys club and an individual’s biases, though, concern
themselves more with the individual and not the system as a whole.
To indict the entire institution of arbitration based upon the biases
and potential discriminatory behavior of a select few is simply unfair
and prejudicial to all practitioners. 104 Whether pure discrimination
plays a role in the diversity struggle remains unknown, mainly
because people do not openly flaunt their discrimination. Instead,
certain aspects of the international arbitration system itself thwart
tribunal diversity. For example, an overall lack of transparency in the
actual arbitrator selection process is a systemic flaw in the institution
that prevents new faces from joining arbitral tribunals.
A.

Lack of Transparency: The Problem and Proposed Solutions to help
Diversify Tribunals.

Despite living in an age when technology permits us to access
information on almost any subject, the fact remains that the primary
method by which parties research and choose an arbitrator is by word
of mouth 105—an old-fashioned phone call to a friend or colleague. Why
is this the case? Part of the issue, which just happens to be one of

101. Thomas J. Stipanowich, A Recent Survey of Experienced U.S.
Arbitrators Highlights Areas For Further International Study and
KLUWER
(Feb.
6,
2015),
Discussion,
WOLTERS
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com
/2015/02/06/a-recentsurvey-of-experienced-u-s-arbitrators-highlights-areas-for-furtherinternational-study-and-discussion [https://perma.cc/2CC3-EJT5].
102. Haridi, supra note 12, at 314.
103. Id.
104. See Koh, supra note 13, at 713 (arguing that allowing the potential
biases and actions of a few should not implicate the entire arbitration
process).
105. Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, A Second (Quasi-Perfect?) Storm Also in
Arbitration? 34 J. INT’L ARB. 925, 927 (2017).
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arbitration’s biggest perks, is the privacy of it all. 106 Arbitral awards
are not typically public information, and when they are made public,
the arbitrators’ names are removed. 107 Thus, while parties can
typically find general biographical information about arbitrators with
ease, they struggle to find the information they truly desire—those
soft, subjective qualities sought in the selection process—like the
prospective arbitrator’s efficiency, work ethic, and handling of
discovery. 108 Therefore, the only way that counsel can access this
coveted information is by contacting the party or parties who have
routinely or recently worked with the prospective arbitrator—the
word-of-mouth system.
But this word-of-mouth system ultimately “creates an information
bottleneck.” 109 The result? “The limited number of individuals who
can provide such information stifles the ability of newer and more
diverse arbitrators to develop international reputations that . . . are
key to getting appointments.” 110 Another major issue with the wordof-mouth method of gaining information about potential arbitrators is
the subjective nature of it. Person-to-person research “largely confines
assessment of potential arbitrators to subjective evaluation by a
limited number of individuals.” 111 Subjective evaluation becomes more
“telephonic lottery” and less of a systematic evaluation system. 112 And
discrimination materializes more often in a subjective evaluation as
opposed to a systematic one. 113 The result here? Male, pale, and stale.
What compounds the situation even more is the relationship
between the person giving the information about a prospective
arbitrator and the person asking for the information. The extent to
which one feels comfortable to divulge information in response to an
ad hoc, personal inquiry about an arbitrator depends, in large part, on
the relationship between the information seeker and the information
divulger. 114 Colleagues or close friends will speak more candidly about
106. Gary Born, Chapter 1: Overview of International Commercial
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 89 (Kluwer
Law International 2d ed., 2014).
107. Catherine Rogers, Chapter II: The Arbitrator and the Arbitration
Procedure, Transparency in the Arbitrator Selection, in AUSTRIAN
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 79 (Christian Klausegger et
al. eds. 2016).
108. Id.
109. Rogers, supra note 24.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Rogers, supra note 107, at 79-80.
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a prospective arbitrator than two parties who do not share the same
familiarity. 115 Therefore, two people asking the same person about the
same arbitrator could receive different accounts of the prospective
arbitrator—not necessarily conflicting information, but information
that differs with respect to the “complete view” of the arbitrator.116
This lack of a complete view frightens the attorney seeking a strong,
reliable arbitrator. 117 Faced with an incomplete view of a prospective
arbitrator, counsel has almost no choice but to revert to a wellestablished name in the industry to avoid any risk of one of those
landmine arbitrators that affects the entirety of the proceeding. 118
While this current lack of transparency has a direct effect on the
composition of an arbitral tribunal, and continues the lack of diversity
in arbitral tribunals, it also fundamentally hinders a new lawyer
involved in international arbitration, or a lawyer who will participate
in one international arbitration proceeding in her entire career—the so
called “one-shot player.” 119 The lawyer is either a repeat player or a
one-shotter. 120 It is the “repeat players” who “shape the development
of law rather than the ‘one-shotters.’” 121 Indeed, “the ‘one-shotter’ is
the player that does not have the advantage of ‘(1) advance
intelligence...(2) expertise and ready access to specialists...(3)
opportunities to develop facilitative informal relations with
institutional incumbents...[or] (4) interest in his ‘bargaining
reputation’....’” 122 This dichotomy epitomizes the result of the lack of
transparency in the arbitrator selection process. If the selection of the
arbitrator is the most important decision made by counsel in
international arbitration, then “it would seem reasonable to assume
that there is likely no greater ‘repeat player’ advantage—or ‘oneshotter’ disadvantage—than at the time of arbitrator appointment.” 123
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See generally Daniel Schimmel et al., Transparency in Arbitration,
THOMPSON REUTERS 2 (2018) (discussing how transparency removes
some of the concern regarding arbitration and the lack of information
about
arbitrators),
available
at
https://foleyhoag.com//media/files/foley%20hoag/publications/articles/2018/transparency%20i
n%20arbitration_practical%20law_mar2018.ashx.
118. Id.
119. Chiann Bao, Chapter 2: One Shot Players and Arbitrator Selection: A
Fair Shot or a Shot in the Dark? in THE POWER AND DUTIES OF AN
ARBITRATOR 10. (Patricia Shaughnessy & Sherlin Tung eds., 2017).
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Marc Galanter’s article Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. AND SOC. R. 1 (1974)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 12.
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The implications of this perceived (and possibly real) advantage is
the following logical thought process: Repeat players have an
information advantage over one-shotters with respect to the arbitrator
selection process—mainly the advantage of having the coveted
information about an arbitrator. If we assume that these repeat
players constitute a relatively small number of firms, 124 then these
firms are likely to receive a disproportionate number of appointments
in relation to the entire international arbitration field. 125 The belief is
that this disproportionate number of appointments makes these
repeat players “gatekeepers” to the arbitral process. 126 And most
importantly, this division between repeat players and one-shotters
may also reduce the volume and diversity of the arbitrator pool. 127
These observations of the system, though, are not from an
outsider’s perspective. In 2015, the Queen Mary-White & Case Survey
polled international arbitration practitioners about improvements that
respondents would like to see in the international arbitration
practice. 128 The overwhelming response was a call for institutions to
“provide more information about arbitrator performance and increase
transparency about institutional decision making in relation to
arbitrator appointments and challenges.” 129 Interestingly, arbitral
institutions realized that providing this information led to increased
use of that same institution. 130 Therefore, a major incentive to attract
counsel and parties to use that institution was precisely to open this
vault of information that counsel typically sought by the word-of-

124. No assumption is really needed because resources like the Global
Arbitration Review’s “Top 30” corroborate that a small amount of law
firms receive the most amount of cases. The Global Arbitration Review
is a subscription-based website whose paywall prevents easy access to
some of their resources See, Richard Wooley, GAR 30 Revealed, GLOBAL
ARBITRATION REVIEW, Feb. 26, 2015. But for those who cannot access
the website, a basic look at the GAR’s methodology can be found at
Best International Arbitration Law Firms and Practice Groups
Worldwide: 2018 Rankings, ACERIS LAW (Oct. 17, 2018)
https://www.acerislaw.com/best-international-arbitration-law-firms/
[https://perma.cc/K37R-49YX]. Finally, a copy of the 2017 PDF
containing
the
GAR
30
rankings
can
be
found
at
https://res.cloudinary.com/lbresearch
/image/upload/v1490004001/GAR302017_ukcmcn.jpg
[https://perma.cc/98E2-SHZU].
125. Bao, supra note 119, at 13.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Rogers supra note 107, at 76.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 78-9.
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mouth-system. 131 As a business decision, it is an unequivocal win: an
arbitral tribunal’s reputation improves by this commitment to
transparency and, in so doing, attracts more business—i.e. parties and
counsel choose that institution and pay that institution for its
services. Calling for transparency in the arbitrator selection process
was once “akin to threatening to raze the gates of Rome and sack its
inhabitants.” 132 Now, transparency of some sort is the norm for some
arbitral institutions. 133
B.

The Best Chance to Succeed Conundrum Requires Counsel to Put
the Client’s Interests Above Diversity Initiatives.

Another major factor that contributes to the lack of diversity in
tribunals is “the best chance to succeed” conundrum. 134 The
international arbitration community is highly sensitive to perceptions
of its own legitimacy. 135 The observations detailed up until this point
constitute more of the negative beliefs of how the same names
continue to dominate arbitral tribunals, and why there exists a lack of
diversity in international arbitration. Accordingly, “indictments” like
those addressed in this Note “should be taken seriously and be refuted

131. Id. at 79.
132. Id. at 75.
133. Some of the leading institutions have made serious commitments to
transparency. The ICC now mandates a prospective arbitrator to
disclose the number of arbitrations in which he or she is currently acting
as well as that arbitrator’s availability going forward. See generally,
Note to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the
Arbitration under the ICC Rules of Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Sept. 2016 (mandating prospective arbitrators
to disclose the number of arbitrations in which he or she is currently
acting as well as that arbitrator’s availability going forward). The
Commercial Arbitration Centre of Lisbon – Portugal has implemented
“Criteria for the appointment of arbitrators by the Centre approved by
the Board of the Arbitration Centre of the Portuguese Chamber of
Commerce and Industry.” The essence of these guidelines is to regulate,
increase party input, and make the overall arbitrator selection process
more transparent. In a different manner, the Hong Kong International
Arbitration Court (HKIAC) now uses feedback forms to evaluate the
institution’s performance as well as the arbitral tribunal’s management
of a case. For more information regarding these efforts as well as others
not listed, see Rogers supra note 107, at 78.
134. See Nieuwveld, supra note 2 (referring to this conundrum as choosing
between the “weathered veteran” or the “young buck”); see also,
Rogers, supra note 25 (describing the conundrum as the “diversity
paradox” wherein counsel wants to provide the best chance to succeed
while also trying to help diversify tribunals).
135. Catherine Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International
Arbitration 8 NEV. L. J. 341, 377 (2007).
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where possible.” 136 To leave these accusations unaddressed might “cast
a pall over the legitimacy of international arbitration and allow
baseless suspicions to fester.” 137 Therefore, while some see invidious
discrimination and systemic shortcomings as a reason for a lack of
diversity in international arbitration, another group of individuals
explain the lack of diversity as a mere consequence of counsel’s ethical
obligation to give a client the best chance to succeed. 138
Just as a client wants to choose “the best” law firm or attorney,
so, too, does the client (through counsel’s recommendation) wish to
have the “best” arbitrator. Obviously “best” has different meanings.
It can mean the arbitrator most likely to rule in one’s favor, or simply
an arbitrator with substantial experience. 139 That “big-name”
arbitrator is easy to choose then, because counsel “can feel confident
that [the arbitrator] could likely quote every important book written
on the subject matter which may greatly influence the outcome of
[the] arbitral proceedings.” 140 This “best arbitrator available” view is
best illustrated by the response of an anonymous commentator to a
survey on international arbitration who stated, “When asked by a
client to select an arbitrator, the desirability of promoting diversity is
the last feature on anyone’s mind. ‘We are not being asked to make a
statement’ he said, ‘we are asked to pick the best person for the
job.’” 141
The BLP Survey 142from Section III of this Note also touched upon
this “best arbitrator” theme. Corroborating the anonymous
commentator’s views, 93% of respondents felt that a prospective
arbitrator’s expertise was either “very important” or “important”
whereas only 54% felt that it was desirable to have a “diverse”
136. Koh, supra note 13, at 713.
137. Id.
138. See generally id. (justifying the tendency for repeat appointments to
ensure a better result for clients).
139. See, e.g., Daniel Girsberger & Nathalie Voser, Chapter 3: The Arbitral
Tribunal, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COMPARATIVE AND SWISS
PERSPECTIVES 158 (3d ed., 2016) (discussing how experience of the
arbitrator is tantamount in some instances); see also, e.g., William W.
Park, Part III Chapter 9: Arbitrator Integrity, in THE BACKLASH
AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 203 (Michael Waibel et al. eds.,
2010) (“Party participation in the constitution of a tribunal means that
each side will want to be sure that its nominee (and the presiding
arbitrator if possible) will be free of doctrinal predispositions that would
adversely affect its case”).
140. Nieuwveld, supra note 2.
141. Lucy Greenwood & C. Mark Baker, Getting a Better Balance on
International Arbitration Tribunals 28 J. OF THE LONDON COURT OF
INT’L ARB. 653, 661 n.42 (2012).
142. BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER, supra note 38.
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tribunal. 143 Curiously, when asked how important gender and
ethnicity were when choosing an arbitrator, 52% of respondents noted
“not important at all” for the former, and 30% noted “not important
at all” for the latter. 144 Nothing nefarious exists in this mindset.145
Indeed, “[a]ppointing parties cannot reasonably be expected to
appoint arbitrators they are unfamiliar with or do not trust.” 146 A
lawyer’s ethical obligation to provide her client with the best chance
possible to prevail, therefore, practically requires the lawyer to search
for that repeat player—that arbitrator who has such an extensive
body of work (writings, awards, interviews, etc.) that counsel can,
with some certainty, guess how that arbitrator will rule. 147 With high
stakes, and the possibility of an arbitral award making the whole
proceeding a zero sum game, any temptation to choose that “dark
horse” candidate in the name of promoting diversity disappears.
For the lawyer wishing to make a change in the system, this
situation presents the ultimate diversity paradox. 148 How can we
further diversity initiatives while still honoring the ethical obligation
to give clients the best chance to succeed? As Catherine Rogers notes,
“The key to resolving this paradox is to close the gap between the
altruism that animates abstract concerns about diversity, and the
strategic pragmatism that dominates arbitrator selection in individual
cases.” 149 But all of the surveys, the writings, and the calls for
diversity rest on some assumption that the lack of diversity in
international arbitration negatively impacts the practice. 150 Since some
proponents go so far as to say that the continued existence of

143. Id. at 9.
144. Id. at 8.
145. Haridi, supra note 13, at 315 (“. . . counsel’s duty is to appoint an
arbitrator in the best interest of the client, not necessarily in the best
interests of diversity. Appointing an unqualified arbitrator simply
because he or she is diverse would be ethically deficient. However,
similarly appointing an unqualified arbitrator simply because he is a
white male of a certain age would also be ethically deficient).
146. Koh, supra note 13, at 735.
147. See Rogers, supra note 107, at 82 (explaining how arbitral awards can
be used to investigate arbitrator’s decision-making practices).
148. Rogers, supra note 24.
149. Id.
150. Patricia Živković, Diversity in International Arbitration: Where Do We
Stand? An Overview of a Berwin Leighton Paisner Survey, WOLTERS
KLUWER
(Feb.
9,
2017),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/02/09/ diversity-ininternational-arbitration-where-do-we-stand-an-overview-of-a-berwinleighton-paisner-survey/ [https://perma.cc/SF32-72NM].
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international arbitration depends upon diversifying tribunals, 151
ascertaining the extent of the problem—if one even exists—is pivotal
to address such claims. Even generally speaking, it is impossible to
address the diversity problem without first understanding why it is an
issue.

V. All of the Criticism about Diversity Assumes that
there is Poison in the Well. But is there?
A lack of diversity in arbitral tribunals is just one of the many
concerns that involve arbitrators. The arbitral tribunal is a lightning
rod for attention and controversy. One of the most egregious abuses
of the system occurred in 2009 after the Republic of Croatia and the
Republic of Slovenia concluded a treaty to settle land and maritime
disputes by arbitration. 152 In the ensuing arbitration, Slovenia and
Croatia each appointed their own arbitrator. 153 Three more
distinguished members joined the two party-appointed arbitrators,
resulting in a five-member tribunal. 154 About five months before the
expected award, a Croatian daily newspaper published transcripts and
audio recordings of conversations between the Slovenian arbitrator
and the Slovenian agent. 155 The revelations demonstrated arguably
the worst abuse of the party-appointed arbitrator process: the agent
and arbitrator colluded over how best to sway the Tribunal to rule in
favor of Slovenia. 156
Luckily, behavior like this is not common in international
arbitration. 157 Indeed, bribery or manipulation of a judicial figure is
not limited only to international arbitrators. 158 Ridding these
institutions of corruption and bribery—or some other serious flaw—
should be the goal of the international community. The push for
diversity in international arbitration assumes that non-diverse
151. van Haersolte-Van Hof, supra note 99, at 648.
152. Menon, supra note 47, at 348-50 (explaining in much more detail the
disaster that followed the revelations).
153. Id. at 349.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 350.
158. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate, for Just the 8th Time, Votes to Oust a
Federal Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com
/2010/12/09/us/politics/09judge.html [https://perma.cc/U8SP-DTAA]
(detailing the impeachment of Judge G. Thomas Porteous Jr., a federal
judge, for accepting bribes and making statements under penalty of
perjury).
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tribunals are problematic in this fashion. 159 Nothing of the same
gravity of the Slovenia-Croatia debacle is directly attributable to the
lack of diversity in international arbitration, though. 160 But several
other issues do require us to ask if a lack of diversity is a fundamental
flaw that jeopardizes the future of international arbitration as a global
dispute resolution mechanism. This section looks at three main issues
that directly stem from having the same people adjudicate the same
claims across the world: repeat appointments and the appearance of
bias; moral justifications for diversity; and cultural differences and the
relation to fact-finding.
A.

Repeat Appointments and the Appearance of Bias is a Potential
Problem that can be connected to a Lack of Diversity. 161

Repeat appointments are a source of tension in international
arbitration, and the diversity issue attached to repeat appointments
exacerbates the criticisms. 162 The party-appointed arbitrator and the
current system are ripe for controversy and corruption. 163 Seeing the
same names appointed by the same law firms can lead a reasonable
person to imagine a quid pro quo system is in place. 164 This system
appears to create an inevitable tension. Arbitrators earn substantial
fees for their professional services. 165 Accordingly, “there is . . . a
159. See, e.g., Darius J. Khambata, Tensions Between Party Autonomy and
Diversity, in LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES 620 (Albert
Jan van den Berg ed., 2015) (representing the common reasons given for
diversity, none of which rise to a level of severity as expressed in the
Slovenia v. Croatia debacle).
160. Id.
161. For this section, the diversity issue is not traditional diversity (minority
and gender representation), but instead it is the consequence of the
small pool of arbitrator concept—seeing the same people adjudicate
proceedings across the world.
162. See e.g., Natalia Giraldo-Carrillo, The ‘Repeat Arbitrators’ Issue: A
Subjective Concept, 19 INT. LAW: REV. COLOMB. DERECHO INT. 75-106
(2011) (discussing the issues related to repeated appointments of
arbitrators in conjunction with diversity of panels).
163. See Seth H. Lieberman, Something’s Rotten in the State of PartyAppointed Arbitration: Healing ADR’s Black Eye that is “Non-Neutral
Neutrals,” 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 215 (2004) (describing the
controversial nature of party-appointed arbitrators and their potential
corruptive nature).
164. Smit, supra note 4 (“Once selected, an arbitrator’s personal incentive is
to secure reemployment by providing his or her party with a favorable
outcome”).
165. See generally Gary Born, Chapter 13: Rights and Duties of International
Arbitrators, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed.,
2014) (explaining in detail the arbitrator’s fees and how those fees are
calculated across various rules and laws).
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financial incentive to promote one’s attractiveness as a prospective
appointee which could, in the eyes of the appointing party, turn on
the likely outcome of the cases for which they are appointed.” 166
Undoubtedly, this system contradicts the notion that adjudicators
should have no interest—especially a pecuniary one—in the outcome
of a case. 167 Therefore, one of the thoughts about the party-appointed
arbitrator is that the appointment of the arbitrator translates into an
automatic vote for the party who appointed him or her. 168 Hence,
some parties feel that if their arbitrator joins in an award in favor of
the other side, that arbitrator is a traitor to the cause. 169
Imagine, then, seeing the same law firm appoint the same
arbitrator, and prevail more often than not when that arbitrator is on
the tribunal. Is this coincidence or bias? Were the awards unanimous?
Did the arbitrator grant provisional measures that helped her
appointing party? 170 It is not difficult to understand that the optics of
repeat appointments invite these questions of bias or prejudice. They
“put a cloud on due process” and create issues of legitimacy in the
eyes of insiders and outsiders. 171 If tribunals are dominated by older,
white males from Western cultures, and these same men are
appointed as arbitrators by the same client or law firm year in and
year out, international arbitration looks like it lives up to its
reputation as an “old boys network.” 172
Given the international arbitration community’s sensitivities to
the outside world’s perception of its inner-workings, 173 repeat
appointments became an issue that needed immediate attention.
Accordingly, in 2004, the International Bar Association published the
IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 174

166. Menon, supra note 47, at 356.
167. Id.
168. Herman Duarte, Unilateral Appointments in International Commercial
Arbitration. Is it time to Change the Way Arbitral Tribunals are
Constituted?, LAW IN SOCIETY, 101 (2013).
169. Mclaren, supra note 55, at 235.
170. These are the types of questions that are asked when an arbitrator is
challenged on the basis of repeat appointments. See Tidewater Inc., v.
The Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela, Int’l Centre for Settlement of Inv.
Disp., No. ARB/10/5 (2010) (submitting questions similar to the
aforementioned).
171. Nairac, supra note 6, at 141.
172. Id. at 140.
173. Rogers, supra note 134.
174. See IBA Guidelines, supra note 10.
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which deals directly with repeat appointments and other conflicts of
interest in international arbitration. 175
The Guidelines are split into four lists—the non-waivable red list,
the waivable red list, the orange list, and the green list. 176 Each list
contains mini fact-patterns of examples of conflicts of interest whose
severity—or need for disclosure—varies depending upon which colored
list contains the conflict of interest. 177 Article 3.1.3. on the Orange
List contains one of the more controversial attempts to curb repeat
appointments: “The arbitrator has, within the past three years, been
appointed as arbitrator on two or more occasions by one of the
parties, or an affiliate of one of the parties.” 178 Here, the IBA
Guidelines are taking issue with the same company or country
appointing the same arbitrator year in and year out. Article 3.3.8 is
written in the same style, targeting repeat appointments with respect
to the lawyer and law firms in general. 179 Thus, the law firm that taps
the same arbitrator every year for a new proceeding will have
difficulties complying with this guideline. At some point, counsel will

175. Id.
176. See id. at 17-25 (“The Non-Waivable Red List includes situations
deriving from the overriding principle that no person can be his or her
own judge. Therefore, acceptance of such a situation cannot cure the
conflict. The Waivable Red List covers situations that are serious but
not as severe. Because of their seriousness, unlike circumstances
described in the Orange List, these situations should be considered
waivable, but only if and when the parties, being aware of the conflict of
interest situation, expressly state their willingness to have such a person
act as arbitrator, as set forth in General Standard 4(c). The Orange List
is a non-exhaustive list of specific situations that, depending on the facts
of a given case, may, in the eyes of the parties, give rise to doubts as to
the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence. The Orange List thus
reflects situations that would fall under General Standard 3(a), with the
consequence that the arbitrator has a duty to disclose such situations. In
all these situations, the parties are deemed to have accepted the
arbitrator if, after disclosure, no timely objection is made, as established
in General Standard 4(a). Finally, [t[he Green List is a non-exhaustive
list of specific situations where no appearance and no actual conflict of
interest exists from an objective point of view.” Thus, the arbitrator has
no duty to disclose situations falling within the Green List. As stated in
the Explanation to General Standard 3(a), there should be a limit to
disclosure, based on reasonableness; in some situations, an objective test
should prevail over the purely subjective test of ‘the eyes’ of the
parties.).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 22.
179. See id. at 24 (“The arbitrator has, within the past three years, been
appointed on more than three occasions by the same counsel, or the
same law firm”).
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run out of “the usual suspects” and resort to a fresh face—a new
arbitrator never before appointed by that law firm. 180
Much of the other Guidelines that target repeat appointments
work in this same fashion. 181 But two main criticisms arise with the
Guidelines in their application to repeat appointments: the fact that
the Guidelines are simply guidelines, and the quantitative approach
the Guidelines take. By the drafters’ own admissions, the Guidelines
“are not legal provisions and do not override any applicable national
law or arbitral rules chosen by the parties.” 182 They are mere
guidelines that “reflect the understanding of the IBA Arbitration
Committee as to the best current international practice.” 183 Despite
this possible roadblock, the Guidelines have almost universal
acceptance in international arbitration. 184 Between 2004 and 2009, the
ICC found that out of 187 arbitrator challenges, 106 of those reference
an article of the IBA Guidelines. 185
Yet, the successes of the IBA Guidelines lead some to question its
quantitative approach. 186 Arguing for a qualitative approach to repeat
appointments, one scholar succinctly sums up why the plug-anddisqualify approach of Article 3.1.3 fails: “Repeat appointments could
be a result of an arbitrator’s independence and impartiality” and not
a sign of impropriety. 187 Similarly, the number of appointments simply
says nothing about the a true conflict of interest:
“By presuming dependence based on absolute numbers removed
from context, the quantitative approach displaces the proper
approach of assessing the significance (if any) of the repeat
appointments against the wider factual backdrop. Any practical
advantages of such a quantitative approach in terms of
180. An active international arbitration law firm might easily be involved in
10+ proceedings in a span of three years. Arbitrator selection becomes a
game of numbers and timing for appointing the right arbitrator. Counsel
might find themselves in a position where all of their preferred
arbitrators have been appointed by that same law firm numerous times
in the previous three years. This situation would run afoul of Guideline
3.3.8, and require the law firm to pick an arbitrator never before
appointed by that law firm.
181. See IBA Guidelines, supra note 10, at 20 (“The arbitrator has given
legal advice, or provided an expert opinion, on the dispute to a party or
an affiliate of one of the parties.”).
182. IBA Guidelines, supra note 10, at 3.
183. Id. at 2.
184. Moses, supra note 11.
185. Id.
186. For a discussion, see generally Koh, note 13, at 729-39.
187. Id. at 718-19.
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certainty are illusory because most would agree that uncertain
justice is still better than certain injustice.” 188

This response to the Guidelines illustrates the sensitivity
surrounding any attempts to regulate the arbitrator selection process.
Furthermore, “the [IBA Guidelines’] approach can be seen either as
an intrusion on the parties’ fundamental right to select arbitrators or
a small step towards safeguarding the legitimacy of arbitration.” 189
Whatever side of this spectrum one believes, the fact remains that
the IBA Guidelines represent a real attempt to combat one aspect of
the diversity issue in international arbitration—the phenomenon of
seeing the same arbitrators in a majority of the proceedings. The IBA
Guidelines help ensure, as realistically as possible, that the arbitral
proceeding is not damaged or influenced by repeat appointments or
similar conflicts of interest that lead critics of international
arbitration to imagine quid-pro-quo agreements between an arbitrator
and her appointing party. 190 They serve as a check on the system, and
actively combat possible negative effects of non-diverse tribunals.
Therefore, critics’ concerns that a lack of new arbitrators has a
negative effect on arbitration have been addressed, and continue to be
a work in progress. If there were a so-called “poison in the well”
because of repeat appointments, the arbitral community has met this
concern with initiatives like the IBA Guidelines. But a larger calling
for traditional diversity continues to dominate the practice area.
While diversity in the repeat appointments context is a concern, the
lack of minorities or equal gender representation, to some, also has a
substantial effect on the quality of arbitral proceedings.
B.

The Moral Argument for Diversity Lacks Tangibility and Feels Too
Much Like a Direct Infringement on Party-Autonomy.

In June 2015, the Director General of the London Court of
International Arbitration, Jacomijn J. van Haersolte-Van Hof,
published her article Diversity in Diversity. 191 With respect to why
diversity is potentially relevant, van Haersolte-Van Hof notes,
“[D]iversity and inclusion are commendable because they ensure a
better product, in this case a better arbitration process resulting in
better arbitration awards.” 192 Quoting an ABA Report, she concludes
188. Id. at 734.
189. Id. at 738.
190. See Jeffrey Waincymer, Part II: The Process of an Arbitration, Chapter
5: Selection, Challenge and Change of Arbitrators, in PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 298-299 (Jan. 2012)
(detailing in part the IBA Guidelines’ approach to major financial
conflicts of interest with respect to arbitrator appointments).
191. van Haerolte-Van Hof, supra note 99.
192. Id. at 641.
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that, “[A] diverse legal profession is more just, productive, and
intelligent because diversity, both cognitive and cultural, often leads
to better questions, analyses, solutions, and processes.” 193
This idea that diversity yields better results appears in numerous
publications about the subject. 194 Most scholars and writers that
maintain this view referenced in a Harvard Business Review195 study,
which concluded that diverse teams are smarter. 196 Other studies
about the effects of diversity in general yield similar results: diverse
teams have increased creativity and productivity, and produce wholly
better products. 197 So important is diversity, that proponents even
state that “diversity on the tribunal is crucial to sustain arbitration as
a modern, flexible, and desirable method of dispute resolution.” 198
From this author’s perspective, the intangibility of these
justifications for diversity initiatives prevents proponents from
convincing skeptics or even neutral persons that a lack of diversity is
detrimental to international arbitration. Part of the problem is the
amorphous concept that diversity automatically yields a better
product. Notwithstanding the intangibility of the term “better
product,” proponents that advocate this way gloss over the reality
that, in the throes of any adversarial system, parties simply do not
care about a “good product”—they just want to win. 199 No matter
how well written a judicial opinion or arbitral award, the losing party
will probably not find solace in a “good product.” 200
Perhaps what these critics mean is that a diverse tribunal will be
more likely than not to decide cases correctly. But even this
contention rests on weak reasoning. Unless one’s case is so black and
white that only a fool would mess up the result, most issues that
make it all the way to hearings on the merits can go for the claimant
or the respondent. To make matters worse for this line of reasoning—
193. Id. at 642.
194. See, e.g., David Rock & Heidi Grant, Why Diverse Teams are
Smarter, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 4, 2016) https://hbr.org/2016/11/whydiverse-teams-are-smarter [https://perma.cc/9GQG-KKHF] (discussing
the importance of diversity for a better workplace).
195. Id.
196. Rogers, supra note 24; Haridi, supra note 12.
197. Haridi, supra note 12, at 310.
198. Id. at 307.
199. Rogers, supra note 24.
200. As the tennis great Andre Agassi once reflected, “Now that I’ve won a
slam, I know something very few people on earth are permitted to know.
A win doesn’t feel as good as a loss feels bad, and the good feeling
doesn’t last long as the bad. Not even close.” ANDRE AGASSI, OPEN 167
(1st eds., 2009).
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that diversity yields better results—international arbitration does not
conform to any real system of stare decisis. 201 Accordingly, it is
difficult to argue that diverse tribunals are more likely than not to
apply the law correctly to a dispute since, quite frankly, stare decisis
in international arbitration is not nearly as important as it is in other
legal worlds. 202
Or, perhaps these critics are imagining the following scenario: an
arbitral tribunal, comprised of three older men from Western cultures,
hears a case about a construction dispute between contractors and
subcontractors in Africa, regarding competing contracts governed by
an African nation’s laws, in a language that no arbitrator on the
panel speaks. The argument in this instance would be that the
arbitrators are less likely to understand the law because it is foreign
to them. But critics are wise not to make this argument. Why?
Because this line of criticism is essentially calling into question the
intelligence or analytical reasoning of arbitrators in their abilities to
interpret a foreign law. Interpreting a foreign law is commonplace in
international arbitration 203—even court systems around the world do
this. 204 So, to argue that non-diverse tribunals misapply law in general
risks insulting one’s professional capacities.
Therefore, to take the conclusions of studies that draw a direct
line between diversity and some positive result, and to apply that
thinking to arbitral tribunals requires some finding that the system
right now is failing because of this lack of diversity. And critics that
rely on this thinking simply do not point to tangible, concrete

201. See generally Dolores Bentolila, Chapter 4: Arbitrators’ Constraints in
Arbitral Decision-Making in ARBITRATORS AS LAWMAKERS (Bentolila
ed., 2017) (explaining the contours of precedent in international
arbitration and describing how, though no precedent exists, this by no
means suggests that arbitrators do not look to previous decisions); But
see, August Reinisch, Chapter VI: Investment Arbitration - The Role of
Precedent in ICSID Arbitration, in AUSTRIAN ARBITRATION YEARBOOK
2008 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2008) (describing the importance
of precedent in investor-state arbitration despite the fact that no
precedent exists in international arbitration).
202. See generally, Bentolila, supra note 201 and Reinisch, supra note 201
(discussing the constraints on arbitrators when issuing decisions).
203. See Dolores Bentolila, Chapter 3: Arbitrators’ Freedom in Arbitral
Decision-Making, in ARBITRATORS AS LAWMAKERS 83 (Kluwer Law
International ed., 2017) (detailing all of the law interpreting that
arbitrators routinely perform in both the commercial and investor state
contexts).
204. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (“In determining foreign law, the court
may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony,
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence.”).
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evidence of tribunals failing in their duties because of a lack of
diversity. 205
While this Note takes issue with the “diversity yields better
results” conclusion, it does not disagree with these scholars’
assessment that diverse tribunals can help legitimize international
arbitration. Just as citizens want to see a cross section of society
reflected in the judiciary, so, too, some argue, should arbitral
tribunals reflect a cross section of the business world—modern,
creative, and diverse. 206 The argument is one of public perception, too:
a country’s judicial system should reflect those who come before it—
thus, a diverse society should be judged by a diverse bench. 207 Yet
this argument overlooks the fact that a state’s judicial system serves a
much broader population than international arbitration.208
International arbitration serves a very select community—primarily
international businesses, in the context of international commercial
arbitration. 209 So, if those who judge us should resemble us, how does
a tribunal properly resemble a corporation? In fact, parties that come
before international tribunals are parties that have forgone their right
to resort to a state’s judicial system. 210 Do these parties have the same
expectations of an arbitral tribunal that they would have of a state’s
judiciary? The tension, of course, is that international arbitration, at
its core, was an attempt to get away from a state’s judicial system.211
Therefore, trying to close the gap between the two legal systems—the
judiciary and international arbitration—feels somewhat wrong.
Ultimately, once again, diversity becomes an issue with respect to
optics. According to at least one United States senator, international
arbitrators are not neutral judges; they are “highly-paid corporate
205. See, e.g., Marques, supra note 8; Haridi, supra note 12; Ohri, supra note
23; Mamounas, supra note 36; van Haerolte-Van Hof, supra note 99
(Each of these analyses of diversity international arbitration
demonstrate the common reasons given for the need to diversify
tribunals. But not one of these authors state that tribunals somehow fail
because of a lack of diversity).
206. Haridi, supra note 12, at 308.
207. Id. at 307-8.
208. See What is International Arbitration?, INT’L ARB. INFO.,
https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/what-isinternational-arbitration/
[https://perma.cc/3LYN-Z6GU]
(“International arbitration can be used to resolve any dispute that is
considered to be ‘arbitrable,’ a term whose scope varies from State-toState, but which includes the majority of commercial disputes.”).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Born, supra note 106, at 30 (explaining how, even in the 8th century up
until today, arbitration was used to avoid the established judicial
systems and its drawbacks).
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lawyers [who] go back and forth between representing corporations
one day and sitting in judgment the next….” 212 Anything to help
eradicate this belief is welcomed; anything to further this belief
weakens international arbitration. A diverse tribunal can certainly
strengthen the perception of legitimacy of international arbitration. 213
Just as addressing repeat appointments arguably works to help
legitimize international arbitration’s standing in the legal world, so,
too, does seeing tribunals that reflect the modern business world—or
at least what we hope the modern business world to be: diverse.
C.

Cultural Differences Related to Fact Finding Is One of the Strongest
Arguments for Diverse Tribunals.

Perhaps the most compelling call for diversity is the way that
culture interacts with the interpretation of facts. In essence, the
argument is that because “[t]he same set of facts could be attributed
different meanings because of the fact finders’ cultural backgrounds” a
more culturally diverse arbitral tribunal will correctly apply the facts
to the law. 214 The reason why facts are of such importance, beyond
serving the narrative of the case, is because “[f]acts always grow out
of cultural interactions.” 215 For example, “African arbitrators would
probably not be dumbfounded by a witness who points to an orange
identification card and calls it yellow because in many African
cultures, yellow represents a range of colors, including orange.” 216
Pausing and reflecting on this approach to the diversity issue in
international arbitration fills the gaps that are left open by those who
preach the “better product” theory. It is a conceded fact that the
majority of international arbitrators are white men from Western
cultures. 217 These arbitrators handle disputes from literally all over
the world. We therefore are asking arbitrators to decide on large
disputes based upon facts that possibly end up lost in cultural
212. Haridi, supra note 13, at 308 (quoting Elizabeth Warren’s op-ed,
Elizabeth Warren, Op-ed, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause
POST
(Feb.
25,
2015),
everyone
should
oppose,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlementlanguage-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25
/ec7705a2-bd1e11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utm_term=.2e7ab13cf6f7
[https://perma.cc/8E5H-J8MT]). It is not clear if Senator Warren has
any experience with international arbitration, or if these remarks were
more geared towards a political statement with respect to the TransPacific Partnership.
213. Id. at 307.
214. Kidane, supra note 21.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER, supra note 39, at 4.
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translation. It is clear, then, that “[t]he determination of fact is
probably the most culturally sensitive step [in the arbitral process],
but the ability to correctly determine facts is perhaps the most
ignored of all criteria for arbitrator selection.” 218 Therefore, it is not
the arbitrator’s culture that matters. It is more the arbitrator’s ability
to understand the cultural significance of certain facts. No survey thus
far appears to probe this area.
This critique instantly feels more tangible than any statement
that diversity yields better results. Interpreting foreign laws requires a
certain set of skills and education whereas interpreting facts correctly
requires something much more nuanced—something that, assumedly,
cannot be learned as easily as principles of law. 219 If the facts are the
most important part of a dispute, and arbitrator selection is the most
important process of the arbitral proceeding, then making sure that
the arbitrator is one who can properly comprehend and interpret the
facts arguably creates the highest probability of a “correct result,” or
a “better product.” Of course, this conclusion rests on multiple
assumptions. For starters, it assumes that there is a correct result and
an incorrect result in every proceeding. It also assumes that choosing
the arbitrator who can best interpret facts will also correctly
determine a dispute. Overall, though, this distinction is the missing
link in the critiques of the arbitral tribunals that merely state that
diversity ensures a better product.
What the conclusion should be, instead, is that a diverse tribunal
is more likely to interpret facts differently, and therefore possibly
interpret the application of law to those facts in a manner different
than a non-diverse tribunal. This conclusion might not be earthshattering—it might not even seem that important—however, it is
incredibly important to make the connection from diversity to
ramifications in order to convince people why diverse tribunals should
be the norm and not the exception. After all, the diversity issue in
international arbitration has a massive hurdle—convincing people to
implement change.

VI. Changing Individual Behavior Remains the Largest
Obstacle to Diversity Initiatives.
Arguments for or against diversity aside, the largest obstacle
remaining is implementation. Indeed, the decision on who to appoint
as arbitrator is the party’s. 220 Thus, arbitral tribunal diversity
218. Kidane, supra note 20.
219. See Michael Leathes, Chapter 4: Culture, in NEGOTIATION: THINGS
CORPORATE COUNSEL NEED TO KNOW BUT WERE NOT TAUGHT 53 (2017)
(showing the ins and outs of learning and understanding culture in the
context of negotiations).
220. Haridi, supra note 12, at 308.
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depends in part on the will of a party. Only in part, though, because
arbitral institutions appoint arbitrators, too. 221 Depending upon the
situation, the applicable rules, and any disputes between the parties,
the arbitral institution or an appointing authority might actively
participate in the constitution of an arbitral tribunal. 222 These
institutions are in a far better position to exercise their powers to
diversify tribunals. This has become a major trend in the move to
diversify arbitral tribunals. 223 While some institutions use a “closedlist” system that allows a party only to choose an arbitrator from that
list, 224 others have contemplated moving away from this closed-list
system, which therefore expands the pool of potential arbitrators.225
Whatever the method chosen, the trend right now is to demand of
arbitral institutions to be the change—to lead the way in arbitral
tribunal diversity. 226
The more challenging behavior to change is that of the
individual—the client or counsel. On one side of the debate,
proponents argue that “when selecting an arbitrator, [client’s] should
insist on an inclusive list of potential candidates that includes at least
one woman and one younger person. Moreover, law firms should have
221. Int’l Chamber Comm., ICC Arbitration Rules, at Art. 12(5) (2012)
http://internationalarbitrationlaw.com/about-arbitration/internationalarbitration-rules/2012-icc-arbitration-rules/icc-arbitration-rules/
[http://perma.cc/FEJ2-2K5T]; Int’l Chamber Comm., ICC Arbitration
Rules, at Art. 8(4) (1998) https://www.trans-lex.org/750200/_/iccarbitration-rules-1998/#head_13
[http://perma.cc/96VZ-HTUK];
Stockholms Handelskammares Skiljedomsinstitut [Arbitration Institute
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce], 2010 Skiljedomsregler [2010
Arbitration Rules] (Swed.).
222. Gary Born, Chapter 12: Selection, Challenge and Replacement of
Arbitrators, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1654 (2d ed.
2014).
223. See generally Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall, Arbitral Institutions
Are Doing Their Bit; What About The Other Players?, WOLTERS
KLUWER
(Apr.
20,
2017),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/04/20/
arbitralinstitutions-are-doing-their-bit-what-about-the-other-players/
[http://perma.cc/7KDC-8PZS] (detailing arbitral institutions’ diversity
efforts).
224. Khambata, supra note 159, at 620.
225. See generally Ank A. Santens, The Move Away from Closed-List
Arbitrator Appointments: Happy Ending or a Trend to Be Reversed?,
KLUWER
(June
28,
2011),
WOLTERS
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2011/06/28/the-moveaway-from-closed- list-arbitrator-appointments-happy-ending-or-a-trendto-be-reversed/ [perma.cc/U5TW-5LPN] (outlining steps that CIETAC
has taken and whether other tribunals might follow a similar approach).
226. See generally Haridi, supra note 13 (putting the onus on arbitral
institutions to do their part in the diversity push).
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the resources available to produce and recommend such lists.” 227 Some
worry about this approach. 228 Diversity is not an end in itself, they
argue. 229 Instead, “the focus should be on promoting within the
international-arbitration community and as international arbitrators
the best talent, regardless of the diversity markers to which that
talent may correspond.” 230 This notion of international arbitration
adopts a more market-based, economic theory:
“[I]nternational arbitration, as a creature of contract, is driven
by the user community, and users’ interest is in selecting
arbitrators that will best represent their positions and rights,
which includes offering predictability and consistency. So, if the
“male, pale, and stale” presently serves that interest best, the
user community will draw international arbitrators from that
profile pool.” 231

Ultimately, those who take this approach do so, in part, out of a
concern over the ramifications of implementing an “affirmative
action” type approach to diversifying arbitral tribunals.232
International arbitration’s popularity will decline if those who use it
feel their freedom of choice being subordinated to diversity
initiatives. 233 Finding an organic way to maintain party autonomy
while implementing diversity initiatives is the ultimate tension of
“good diversity” and “bad diversity.” Good diversity is when “party
autonomy can be married with diversity without substantial, if any,
conflict at all.” 234 Bad diversity, however, is when the imposition of
diversity occurs to meet some quota or statistical goal. 235
Figuring out organic solutions to the diversity problem is the crux
of it all. As discussed earlier, one of the biggest organic initiatives is
the transparency movement regarding the arbitrator selection process.
Another recognized approach is the “pipeline” theory. 236 Women and
227. Mamounas, supra note 36.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Khambata, supra note 159, at 622 (“Diversity itself cannot be carried
too far. It is not akin to affirmative action and there is no question of
applying ‘quotas’. The challenge is to strike a balance between diversity
in appointment imposed by an institution without stretching party
autonomy to breaking point.”).
233. Mamounas, supra note 36.
234. Khambata, supra note 159, at 635.
235. Id.
236. Haridi, supra note 12, at 311.
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minorities in the “talent pool” of law school slowly exit their careers
in the big law firms that dominate the international arbitration
world. 237 Thus, this “pipeline” loses its diverse qualities, leaving a
small, select few to serve as arbitrators. 238 So, fixing this “pipeline
leak” is one possible organic solution.
But many proponents still place the onus on the client or counsel
to push for diverse candidates and actively change the system by their
own
power. 239
But
even
the
forward-thinking,
gung-ho
lawyer/proponent who wishes to appoint a diverse arbitrator comes
face-to-face with the ethical conundrum: “Appointing an unqualified
arbitrator simply because he or she is diverse would be ethically
deficient.” 240 How then, in the most organic way possible, can the
lawyer convey to her client the need to look to those lessor known
arbitrators—the new faces; the young buck; the arbitrators in the
emerging talented pool who, by virtue of increased representation of
women and minorities in the legal profession over the last several
decades, represent the diversity that so many practitioners want to
see? One possible solution is a conversation about money.

VII. The Financial Incentive to Choose the Newcomer
is an Organic Approach that can be Used to Address
Diversity Concerns.
In 2015, the law firm White & Case, along with Queen Mary
University of London, published their third survey on international
arbitration. 241 The theme was “improvements and innovation” in
international arbitration. 242 One section dealt with both the time and
cost of proceedings. 243 The consensus? “Cost and lack of speed were
both ranked by respondents as amongst the worst characteristics of
international arbitration.” 244 One of the questions in the survey
proposed 15 innovations for the arbitral process, and asked
respondents to rank each innovation on a one to five scale: low scores
237. Id. at 312.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 316.
240. Id. at 315.
241. 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations
in International Arbitration, WHITE & CASE (Oct. 6, 2015),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/2015-internationalarbitration-survey-improvements-and-innovations
[https://perma.cc/YX3X-HKCZ.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 24.
244. Id.
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were for innovations considered “not effective” and high scores were
considered “effective” innovations. 245 The five highest scoring
innovations, starting with the highest scoring, were the following:
1.A requirement that tribunals commit to and notify parties of
a schedule for deliberations and delivery of final award.
2.Stronger pre-appointment scrutiny of prospective arbitrators’
availability.
3.Sanctions for dilatory conduct by parties or their counsel.
4.A requirement for early procedural conference.
5.A pre-hearing preparatory meeting of the arbitral tribunal. 246

Every one of these points with the exception of number three
involves working around arbitrators’ schedules. In fact, all of these
schedule-oriented changes make up subparts of the second point: the
arbitrator’s availability. Recall that one of the objective factors to
take into consideration when selecting an arbitrator is that
arbitrator’s availability. Again, tensions appear. Practitioners want
the big-names—the recognized arbitrators who dominate the
industry. 247 But four of the five biggest criticisms of practitioners
revolve around scheduling concerns that can be directly traced back
to the arbitrator’s prominence in the field, which is subsequently
related back to the arbitrator’s availability. 248
While counsel and practitioners alike might feel the headaches of
prolonged proceedings, delayed submission timelines, and frustrating
attempts simply to schedule pre-hearing meetings, the true burden
falls on the client. Not only will longer proceedings most likely lead to
larger bills, but also the mere fact of choosing a well-known arbitrator
means a higher arbitrator fee. 249 It appears, then, that an arbitrator’s
professional status is a point faible, felt both by counsel and client
alike. But this weak spot is the perfect opportunity to combat, in the
right circumstances, the diversity issue.
Arbitrator selection is a tactical maneuver. Meeting with a client,
and pushing for a diverse tribunal because “diversity yields better
results” is a difficult pitch. Yes, counsel can elaborate on the interplay
of diversity and fact-finding. But even then, that approach is filled
with hedging language (i.e. a diverse tribunal might view facts in a
245. Id. at 25.
246. Id.
247. Bentolila, supra note 201, at 151.
248. White & Case, supra note 241, at 25.
249. Nieuwveld, supra note 2.
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certain manner that could affect the application of law to those facts,
which might result in a different conclusion than another tribunal).
Diversity for diversity’s sake is even a harder pitch to make because
the overriding factor has little to do with case strategy. This “bad”
diversity can come off as virtue signaling—subordinating one’s
tactical choices for good optics.
But exploiting the availability issue of a potential arbitrator is the
perfect opportunity to implement change. By showing a client that
choosing a big-name might have its advantages, it will also lead to a
higher arbitrator’s fee, and most likely result in scheduling concerns
that lengthen the dispute proceedings, and increase overall costs.
Again, some clients might not mind. But not every single proceeding
is a “bet-the-company” dispute.
Accordingly, when it comes to arbitrator selection, there exists a
financial incentive to choose a newcomer. First, that arbitrator most
likely has more time to devote to the proceeding, since theoretically
that arbitrator is not currently involved in numerous proceedings.250
Having an arbitrator solely devoted to one’s case, in theory, means a
quicker turnaround time for action. Second, that arbitrator will most
likely charge smaller fees. 251 Instead of approaching a client with a list
of diverse candidates, explaining that these candidates were chosen
because diversity yields better results, counsel can have a
conversation with the client about budgetary concerns. Imagine
that—a budget constraint might actually help. If counsel can compile
a list of suitable newcomers, and show the client that choosing from
this list will save money and time, all while maintaining the integrity
of the proceeding, it is hard to imagine turning down that offer.
This potential fix is a bit like the transparency movement. It does
not remove a party’s choice—it simply opens the arbitrator pool to
candidates that might not have been previously considered. It does
not require counsel or a client to give up their unfettered freedom
with respect to arbitrator selection. But it does give counsel a great
opportunity to provide a list of up-and-coming arbitrators—who
hopefully represent our diverse world—and give those fresh faces the
chance at establishing their careers. Besides, it only takes one or two
appointments for an arbitrator to break into the international
arbitration world. Once there, the onus is then on those newcomers to
continue to expand the arbitrator pool, and to open doors that, for
them, were seemingly forever closed.

250. Id.
251. Id.
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Conclusion
A lack of diversity in international arbitration is not an
insurmountable problem. It also cannot be fixed immediately. The
tension between party autonomy and implementation of diversity
goals leads to valid concerns about the way in which diversity is
sought and ultimately achieved. The benefit of finding organic
solutions to diversity concerns is that, typically, these efforts also
combat other problematic areas in international arbitration.
Transparency efforts help counsel access tons of previously
inaccessible information; transparency also helps address diversity
concerns. Similarly, a conversation about money could help lead to a
new face on the arbitral tribunal while driving down the costs and
time of a proceeding. Provided that proponents continue to point to
real, positive effects of a diverse tribunal, in a way that does not feel
as if change is being forced upon others, skeptics will let down their
guards and open their ears. That is what counts most anyway—
getting people to listen.
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